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Customer Due Diligence: FinCEN and the Beneficial 
Ownership Requirement for Legal Entity Customers 
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the years since its initial passage in 1970, the Bank Secrecy 
Act (“BSA”)1 has been transformed and adapted to combat the changing 
face of global terrorism and keep pace with new developments in money 
laundering.2  BSA and Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”) regulations 
impose standards aimed at preventing financial crimes by limiting the 
ability of criminals to co-opt financial institutions3 in their criminal 
activity.4  These regulations are necessary with today’s high threat of 
terrorism and the potential use of financial institutions to fund such 
activity.5  In the wake of September 11, 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act 
(“PATRIOT Act”) was passed, amending the BSA, with the purpose of 
deterring and punishing terrorism throughout the world.6  A major theme 
1. Currency and Foreign Trade Transaction Reporting Act of 1970 (“Bank Secrecy
Act”), Pub. L. No.91–508, 84 Stat. 1118 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 
U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., and 31 U.S.C.) (2012). 
2. FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, BANK SECRECY ACT/ ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING EXAMINATION MANUAL 3–4 (2014). 
3. For the purposes of this Note, financial institutions shall include: “(i) Banks; (ii)
brokers or dealers in securities; (iii) mutual funds; and (iv) futures commission merchants and 
introducing brokers in commodities.”  Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial 
Institutions, 79 Fed. Reg. 45151, 45152 n.6 (Aug. 4, 2014) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R Pts. 
1010, 1020, 1023, 1024, and 1026) (defining the scope of financial institutions that will be 
subject to the additional customer due diligence requirements). 
4. Bank Secrecy Act § 121, 12 U.S.C. § 1951; 31 C.F.R. §§ 1010.100(e), 1010.610
(2015); Combating Transnational Organized Crime: Int’l Money Laundering as a Threat to 
Our Fin. System, Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 16 (2012) (statement of Jennifer Shasky Calvery,
Chief Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section, Criminal Division, U.S. Dep’t. of
Justice) [hereinafter Combating Transnational Organized Crime]. BSA/AML regulations set
compliance program standards to prevent crimes such as money laundering from occurring
by requiring “at a minimum— (A) the development of internal policies, procedures, and
controls; (B) the designation of a compliance officer; (C) an ongoing employee training
program; and (D) an independent audit function to test programs.”  Bank Secrecy Act §205,
31 U.S.C. § 5318(h).
5. Combating Transnational Organized Crime, supra note 4, at 16.
6. Mark E. Plotkin & B.J. Sanford, The Customer’s View of “Know Your Customer”—
Section 326 of the USA Patriot Act, 1 BLOOMBERG CORP. L. J. 670, 670–71 (2006). 
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of the PATRIOT Act is the Know Your Customer (“KYC”) idea for 
financial institutions.7  The PATRIOT Act enforces the KYC concept by 
requiring financial institutions to implement customer identification 
programs (“CIP”) as part of their BSA/AML compliance programs so that 
financial institutions know to whom they are lending and for whom they 
are holding money.8 
FinCEN’s9 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Customer Due 
Diligence (the “NPRM”), which was introduced in August of 2014, 
continues the evolution of BSA/AML regulations.10  With the NPRM, 
FinCEN intends to further the BSA’s fundamental goals of promoting 
transparency and protecting the financial system from abuse and fraud.11  
The beneficial ownership requirement introduced in the NPRM expands 
current KYC regulations by requiring financial institutions to identify the 
beneficial owners of legal entity customer accounts.12  The additional 
regulations that FinCEN has proposed come at a hefty price tag; 
according to FinCEN’s Regulatory Impact Assessment (“RIA”), the 
additional Customer Due Diligence (“CDD”) requirements will cost 
financial institutions between $700 million and $1.5 billion.13  FinCEN 
has proposed the beneficial ownership requirement to address the issue 
of accounts being opened by legal entity customers with the purpose of 
avoiding disclosure of the beneficial owner of the account—actions that 
are being used to hide the identity of terrorists and drug smugglers among 
other bad actors.14  While the PATRIOT Act has already addressed 
beneficial ownership, it does so only in two situations: for owners of 
7. Id. at 670
8. Id. at 674.
9. FinCEN derives its authority to “implement, administer and enforce compliance with
the BSA” from the Secretary of the Treasury.  Customer Due Diligence Requirements for 
Financial Institutions, 79 Fed. Reg. 45151, 45152 (Aug. 4, 2014) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R 
Pts. 1010, 1020, 1023, 1024, and 1026). 
10. Id.  An Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“ANPRM”) preceded the Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking in 2012.  Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial 
Institutions, 77 Fed. Reg. 13046 (Mar. 5, 2012). 
11. Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 79 Fed. Reg. at
45152. 
12. Id. at 45155–56.
13. FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REGULATORY
IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR FINCEN NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING: “CUSTOMER DUE 
DILIGENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.” 6 (2015) [hereinafter REGULATORY 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT] (estimating the 10-year quantifiable cost range). 
14. See Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 79 Fed. Reg.
at 45152 (listing examples). 
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private banking accounts; and for correspondent accounts for certain 
foreign financial institutions.15  This Note analyzes the NPRM and its 
commentary, delves into the implications that the additional CDD 
requirements will have on financial institutions as they attempt to 
implement them, and offers predictions and recommendations for the 
final rule. 
This Note proceeds in four parts.  Part II provides an overview of 
the beneficial ownership requirement for legal entity customers.16  Part 
III analyzes the beneficial ownership requirement including specific 
issues regarding the rule, implications of the rule, and recommendations 
for how the final rule might be shaped to address the prior issues.17  
Lastly, Part IV concludes by assessing the effectiveness of the rule.18 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP REQUIREMENT FOR LEGAL
ENTITY CUSTOMERS 
In 2010, FinCEN released guidance on beneficial ownership, 
describing it as “[t]he cornerstone of a strong . . . BSA/AML compliance 
program,”19 leading to an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
(“ANPRM”) in 2012.20  The ANPRM led to the NPRM that was released 
in August of 2014,21 the costs of which FinCEN estimated in late 2015.22  
FinCEN’s NPRM is an attempt to further the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury’s collaboration with the Financial Action Task Force 
(“FATF”)23 and the Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central 
Bank Governors to safeguard the financial system, increase financial 
15. Currency and Foreign Trade Transaction Reporting Act of 1970 (“Bank Secrecy
Act”), §205, 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h) (2012); 31 C.F.R. §§ 1010.620(b)(1), -.630 (2015) (applying 
to private accounts and correspondent foreign accounts respectively). 
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part III.
18. See infra Part IV.
19. FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GUIDANCE ON
OBTAINING AND RETAINING BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP INFORMATION 1 (2010). 
20. Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 77 Fed. Reg.
13046 (Mar. 5, 2012). 
21. Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 79 Fed. Reg.
45151 (Aug. 4, 2014) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. Pts. 1010, 1020, 1023, 1024, and 1026). 
22. REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, at 2.
23. FATF is an “inter-governmental body” created to set forth international standards to
protect the international financial system from “money laundering and the financing of 
terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”  Who We Are, FIN. ACTION TASK 
FORCE, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2015). 
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transparency, and to strengthen CDD requirements within the United 
States and throughout the world.24  FinCEN’s NPRM addresses four areas 
of CDD compliance and sets minimum CDD measures for financial 
institutions to implement in each area: 
1. Identifying and verifying the identity of customers;
2. Identifying and verifying the identity of beneficial
owners of legal entity customers;
3. Understanding the nature and purpose of customer
relationships; and
4. Conducting ongoing monitoring to maintain and
update customer information and to identify and report
suspicious transactions.25
Areas 1, 3, and 4 are required under current BSA/AML 
requirements, but were included in the NPRM to clarify the current state 
of CDD requirements.26  The only new requirement introduced by the 
NPRM is the second area, “identifying and verifying the identity of 
beneficial owners of legal entity customers”27 (the “Beneficial Ownership 
Requirement”).28 
FinCEN breaks the Beneficial Ownership Requirement down 
into two prongs for compliance purposes: 
24. Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 79 Fed. Reg. at
45155. 
25. Id. (reformatted block quote).
26. Id. at 45155–56.
27. “A ‘legal entity’ customer is generally any business enterprise with a few
exceptions.” PETER G. WEINSTOCK, ET AL., HUNTON & WILLIAMS, CLIENT ALERT: FINCEN
EXPANDS CUSTOMER DUE DILIGENCE REQUIREMENTS 3 (2014), 
https://www.hunton.com/files/News/2ef7f567-8636-457b-9536-
8dd8fc7ea81d/Presentation/NewsAttachment/e0ec2f9f-d3fa-426c-b25a-
8f170e7e7e0e/FinCEN_Expands_Customer_Due_Diligence_Requirements.pdf.  “These 
exemptions include any customers that are currently exempt from CIP, as well as parties 
whose beneficial ownership information is generally available to the public from other 
sources such as public companies registered with the SEC.”  Id. (footnote omitted). 
28. Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 79 Fed. Reg. at
45152, 45156. 
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 Ownership Prong: Each individual, if any, who,
directly or indirectly, through any contract,
arrangement, understanding, relationship or
otherwise, owns 25% or more of the equity
interests of a legal entity customer; and
 Control Prong: An individual with significant
responsibility to control, manage or direct a legal
entity customer, including (A) an executive
officer or senior manager (e.g., a Chief Executive
Officer, Chief Financial Officer, Chief Operating
Officer, Managing Member, a General Partner,
President, Vice President, or Treasurer); or (B)
any other individual who regularly performs
similar functions.29
With the addition of the Beneficial Ownership Requirement, 
financial institutions will now be required to identify the beneficial 
owners for a much wider array of accounts.30  Once the final rule has been 
released, financial institutions will be forced to implement the new 
beneficial ownership requirement within one year, allowing FinCEN to 
further enable financial institutions to identify and assess risks, and assist 
law enforcement in financial investigations.31 
The Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC”) comment letter to the 
NPRM provides examples of how the new Beneficial Ownership 
Requirement could have aided law enforcement are discussed in the 
following text.32  In one case, money mules were used to set up bank 
accounts and then preceded to funnel the profits to the true beneficial 
owners who were overseas.33  Had the new Beneficial Ownership 
Requirement been in place the FTC could have quickly initiated an 
investigation into the overseas party, who would have been required to 
29. Id. at 45157; WEINSTOCK, ET AL., supra note 27, at 2 (footnote omitted).
30. Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 79 Fed. Reg. at
45157. 
31. Id. at 45153, 45164.
32. Comment letter from Jessica L. Rich, Dir. Bureau of Consumer Prot., & Michael G.
Vita, Acting Dir. Bureau of Econ., Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network 4 (Oct. 
3, 2014) [hereinafter Rich & Vita Letter], 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FINCEN-2014-0001-0119. 
33. Id.
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be disclosed in order for the money mules to set up the bank accounts.34  
FinCEN says that even if the representations of legal entity customers 
were false, law enforcement would at least have a lead on where to start 
a search.35  More importantly, FinCEN notes that the requirements will 
significantly deter nominee assignments since the natural person listed as 
the nominee would be risking criminal prosecution.36  The FTC says the 
new Beneficial Ownership Requirement would have also aided them in 
determining the beneficial owners of a series of shell companies created 
to hide illegal online poker proceeds payment processing.37  The FTC 
claims that had the Beneficial Ownership Requirements had been in 
place, the dozens of shell companies created by nominees of the 
defendant would have had to list the defendant as the actual beneficial 
owner.38  Had the actual beneficial owner been listed, the vast number of 
accounts created for the defendant would have triggered suspicions, and 
the FTC would have known whom to investigate.39 
III. ANALYSIS OF THE BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP REQUIREMENT AS IT
APPLIES TO LEGAL ENTITY CUSTOMERS 
While the intentions and purpose of the Beneficial Ownership 
Requirement seem to be advantageous, several portions of the proposed 
rule are ineffective and give rise to specific issues and unintended 
consequences.40  Even when there is not a control person, financial 
institutions will still be required to identify one.41  FinCEN states that 
financial institutions will not be required to “verify that the natural 
persons identified on the form [that is filled out by the legal entity 
customer] are in fact the beneficial owners.”42  Rather than verify 
34. Id. at 3.
35. Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions,79 Fed. Reg. at
45162; Rich & Vita Letter, supra note 32, at 4. 
36. REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, at 30.
37. Rich & Vita Letter, supra note 32, at 4.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Comment letter from Senator Carl Levin, Chairman, U.S. Permanent Subcomm. on
Investigations, to Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network 2 (Dec. 10, 2014) [hereinafter Levin Letter], 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FINCEN-2014-0001-0141. 
41. WEINSTOCK, ET AL., supra note 27, at 2.
42. Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 79 Fed. Reg.
45151, 45156 (Aug. 4, 2014) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. Pts. 1010, 1020, 1023, 1024, and 
1026). 
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beneficial ownership information, financial institutions will be allowed 
to rely on the information provided to them by the legal entity customer 
when it opens an account.43  FinCEN and the FTC claim that the 
additional information, even when false, will still be valuable to law 
enforcement agencies.44  The American Bankers Association and the 
Bankers Association for Finance and Trade45 (the “Associations”) state 
that “the marginal benefits to law enforcement are in considerable 
doubt.”46  This doubt is barely addressed by FinCEN in its RIA.47  
FinCEN, rather, lists other beneficial motives for the regulation such as 
reputational benefits to the U.S. Government and “Potential Increased 
Revenue through Improved Tax Compliance.”48  Under the NPRM, 
financial institutions will not be required to retroactively apply the 
Beneficial Ownership Requirements to old accounts, only to accounts 
opened a year after the final rule is released.49  Additionally, while 
financial institutions are not required to update beneficial ownership 
information on a set schedule, FinCEN has stated that financial 
institutions “should” periodically monitor accounts and update beneficial 
ownership information on a risk basis.50 
43. Id. at 45158.  FinCEN postures that even if the information that is reported to them
is false, or if there is not a control person, by having the legal entity customer report a natural 
person, law enforcement will be benefited by having information which can prove “unlawful 
intent and . . . generate[] leads to identify additional evidence or co-conspirators.” Id. at 45153. 
44. Id. at 45162; Rich & Vita Letter, supra note 32, at 4.
45. “BAFT is the leading international transactional banking association . . . [f]ormed by
the merger of the Bankers Association for Finance and Trade (BAFT) and the International 
Financial Services Association (IFSA).” Who We Are, BAFT, http://www.baft.org/about-baft 
(last visited Nov. 14, 2015). 
46. Comment letter from Robert G. Rowe III, Vice President & Assoc. Chief Counsel,
Regulatory Compliance,  Am. Bankers Ass’n, & Tod R. Burwell, President & Chief Exec. 
Officer, BAFT, to Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network 26 (Oct. 3 2014) [hereinafter Rowe & Burwell 
Letter], http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FINCEN-2014-0001-0133. 
47. See REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, at 30.
48. Id. at 18–19.
49. SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, CLIENT ALERT: 2014 YEAR-END REVIEW OF U.S.
BSA/AML AND SANCTIONS DEVELOPMENTS AND THEIR IMPORTANCE TO FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS 18  (2015)
https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_2014_Year_End_Review
_of_US_BSA_AML_and_Sanctions_Developments.pdf. 
50. Rather than requiring financial institutions to periodically update Beneficial
Ownership information FinCEN dictates that “when a financial institution becomes aware of 
information relevant to assessing the risk posed by a customer, it is expected to update the 
customer’s relevant information accordingly.”  WEINSTOCK, ET AL., supra note 27, at 4. 
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A. Specific Issues Raised During the Comment Period
The main issues identified in the extensive comments to the 
NPRM are: (1) the definition of a legal entity customer and the 
exemptions from the definition; (2) the ownership prong of the beneficial 
ownership definition; (3) the control prong of the beneficial ownership 
definition; (4) verification; (5) monitoring; (6) application to new 
accounts only; and (7) the delayed effective date. 
1. Definition of a Legal Entity and the Exemptions from the Definition
Commentary to the NPRM raised the question of what the actual 
definition of a legal entity customer is and what truly falls under the 
reporting exceptions.51  The NPRM did not consider joint ventures, 
international accounts, PACs, or series LLCs, any of which could be 
considered a legal entity customer but are not defined as such in the 
NPRM.52  In the NPRM, FinCEN states that most trusts are not included 
in the definition of a legal entity customer because, due to the contractual 
nature of a trust, financial institutions already have the trustee’s 
information on hand in the event it is needed by law enforcement.53  The 
Clearing House Association (“TCH”) suggests private trusts should have 
a specific exemption in the final rule to provide even more clarification.54  
In addition to clarification on specific types of entities, TCH advocates 
for FinCEN to adopt a comprehensive definition of what a legal entity 
encompasses and to broaden the exemptions to the definition.55 
According to TCH, the definition of a legal entity customer under 
the NPRM is only focused on U.S.-based clients.56  In order to provide 
an effective definition for the final rule, TCH proposes that FinCEN adopt 
51. Comment letter from Ruben Villa, Peoples State Bank, to Fin. Crimes Enf’t
Network. 2 (Sept. 17, 2014) [hereinafter Villas Letter], 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FINCEN-2014-0001-0028. 
52. Id.
53. Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 79 Fed. Reg.
45151, 45159–60 (Aug. 4, 2014) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. Pts. 1010, 1020, 1023, 1024, 
and 1026). 
54. Comment letter from Alaina M. Gimbert, Senior Vice President & Assoc. Gen.
Council, The Clearing House Ass’n, to Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network 10 (Oct. 3, 2014) 
[hereinafter Gimbert Letter], http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FINCEN-
2014-0001-0093. 
55. Id. at 9.
56. Id.
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a comprehensive definition of a legal entity by including entities that are 
registered under equivalent foreign laws.57  In addition, TCH notes that 
the NPRM does not grant exemptions for bank holding companies, 
financial holding companies, or financial market utilities, all of which are 
low risk and are already subject to extensive regulatory oversight.58 
Rather than the rule having an all-encompassing definition with 
a slim set of exemptions, TCH urges a broader set of exemptions, 
determined on a risk basis, be adopted.59  By assessing the risk a legal 
entity customer poses and using that as a filter to determine which 
customers should be covered under the CDD requirements, the vast 
amount of reporting by financial institutions could be minimized.60  The 
Associations point out that if a risk-based approach is adopted and the 
exemptions expanded, then the regulation would allow for financial 
institutions to collect relevant data rather than complying with a “merely 
ministerial collection requirement.”61  By expanding the exemptions, 
FinCEN would be able to better address the legal entity customers that 
are the focus of the new regulation and not subject innocent entities to the 
costs and burdens of the new rule.62 
2. The Ownership Prong of the Beneficial Ownership Definition
FinCEN, in the ownership prong of the Beneficial Ownership 
Requirement, has set a 25% threshold to identify “key individuals” who 
have a substantial interest in the legal entity.63  Chairman of the 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Senator Carl Levin64 
questions the 25% threshold under the ownership prong of the beneficial 
ownership requirement, claiming it is too high and will result in a lack of 
57. Id.
58. Id. at 10.
59. Id. at 9–10.
60. Rowe & Burwell, supra note 46, at 6–7.
61. Id. at 11.
62. See Gimbert Letter, supra note 54, at 10–13.
63. Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 79 Fed. Reg.,
45151, 45158 (Aug. 4, 2014) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. Pts. 1010, 1020, 1023, 1024, and 
1026). 
64. Senator Levin did not seek reelection in 2014 and retired shortly after he penned his
commentary to the NPRM. David Shepardson, Carl Levin: No Regrets on Retiring, Hails 
Peters Win, THE DETROIT NEWS, (Nov. 4, 2014, 10:54 PM), 
http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/elections/2014/11/04/carl-levin-regrets-
retiring-hails-peters-win/18507435/. 
154 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 20 
reporting from bad actors.65  Senator Levin believes disclosure thresholds 
are “generally an ineffective approach.”66  Disclosure thresholds can 
easily be avoided by bad actors rearranging their legal entity so 
ownership percentages are lower than the threshold.67  If a legal entity 
wanted to engage in unlawful actions and avoid putting forth any key 
beneficial owners under the ownership prong, the obvious loophole is for 
the entity to have five or more people serving as equity owners and thus 
avoid reporting.68  Furthermore, Senator Levin believes that a 25% 
threshold is inadequate because Congress has already established a 10% 
threshold for substantial ownership of a corporation under the Foreign 
Account Tax Compliance Act (“FATCA”).69  Not only does the 25% 
threshold create a weaker standard than those already in place elsewhere, 
it incentivizes bad actors to exploit the differentiation between accounts70 
and take advantage of the weaker disclosure threshold.71 
Contrary to Levin, the Associations advocate for leaving the 
threshold at 25%.72  The Associations note that the 10% threshold is in 
place for “enhanced due diligence,” rather than for regular CDD, such as 
the beneficial ownership rule.73  The Associations have also requested 
that the final rule explicitly state that financial institutions are not 
required to determine why a customer’s account does not have any 
owners who meet the 25% threshold, resulting in a lack of reporting.74  
The Associations urge FinCEN to first determine why the 25% threshold 
is not adequate before abandoning it and creating an even stricter 




69. Id.  The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act focuses on reporting by U.S.
taxpayers of “foreign financial accounts and offshore assets” and imposes withholdings for 
non-compliance.  INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, 
https://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Corporations/Foreign-Account-Tax-Compliance-Act-
FATCA (last updated July 15, 2015); 26 U.S.C. § 1473(2)(A) (2012). 
70. Exploitation could occur through bad actors choosing to create an account that is
subject to the 25% threshold as opposed to the 10% threshold by having a nominee set up the 
account. Levin Letter, supra note 40, at 3–4. 
71. Id.
72. Rowe & Burwell Letter, supra note 46, at 9–10.
73. Id.
74. Id.  The Associations worry about being required to determine if the legal entity
customer is actually at the 25% threshold due to the difficulty for a financial institution to 
ascertain whether such statements are correct. Id. 
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regulation.75  After all, the 25% threshold is based upon extensive 
comments to the ANPRM.76 
FinCEN agrees with the Associations concerning a 10% 
threshold, and in its RIA addresses that proposition, along with several 
other alternatives to the 25% threshold.77  FinCEN notes that, while a 
10% requirement would provide more information to law enforcement, it 
would “predominantly impact legitimate legal entities, and impose upon 
them a significant burden that would not be outweighed by the 
incremental benefit to law enforcement.”78 
FinCEN also raised the alternative in its RIA of applying the 25% 
threshold to both existing and new accounts.79  FinCEN posits that such 
a change will be exceedingly beneficial while incurring little additional 
IT costs due to the development that will need to take place for the 
changes.80  This alternative is noteworthy, however, since requiring 
financial institutions to retroactively determine beneficial ownership 
status directly disregards the majority of comments issued relating to the 
final rule.81  FinCEN has recognized that retroactive application of the 
requirements will mean additional work for financial institutions and will 
extend the compliance deadline appropriately.82 
3. The Control Prong of the Beneficial Ownership Definition
The definition of a control person under the Beneficial Ownership 
Requirement is “a single individual with significant responsibility to 
control, manage, or direct a legal entity customer, including (i) An 
executive officer or senior manager . . . ; or (ii) Any other individual who 
regularly performs similar functions.”83  This definition of a control 
person differs from the standard proposed by FATF of “‘incorporat[ing] 
75. Id. at 9.
76. Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 79 Fed. Reg.
45151, 45158 (Aug. 4, 2014) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. Pts. 1010, 1020, 1023, 1024, and 
1026). 
77. REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, at 9.
78. Id.
79. REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, at 10.
80. Id.
81. See Rowe & Burwell Letter, supra note 46, at 11–12.
82. REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, at 9–10.
83. Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 79 Fed. Reg.
45170 (Aug. 4, 2014) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. Pts. 1010, 1020, 1023, 1024, and 1026). 
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those persons who exercise ultimate effective control over a legal person 
or arrangement.’”84  According to Senator Levin, the proposed rule 
focuses on officers who do not exercise actual control of a company and 
rather, are placed in their positions to hide the true directors of the 
company.85  FinCEN has set forth the control prong to embody 
international standards by requiring financial institutions to determine 
who has control of a legal entity customer, however, the proposed rule 
falls short, according to Senator Levin, by not encompassing those who 
have “ultimate effective control”.86 
Requiring a financial institution to identify owners who have 
ultimate effective control would be difficult to implement.87  Further, if 
included in the current rule, the additional requirement would prove moot 
since financial institutions are allowed to rely upon the representations of 
legal entity customers.88  Extensive industry requests have been made 
regarding the final rule to ensure financial institutions do not have to 
verify control status.89  Financial institutions contend they “lack [the] 
ability to verify the status of an individual as a beneficial owner.”90  Thus, 
a final rule requiring financial institutions to verify if a control person 
maintains ultimate effective control would be ineffective—unless the rule 
was made even more overbearing and required verification—since there 
is no structure in place for a financial institution to determine if the initial 
designation of a control person is valid.91 
4. Verification and Monitoring
The NPRM allows financial institutions to rely on representations 
made by legal entity customers, thereby reducing the regulatory burden 
84. Levin Letter, supra note 40, at 5 (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
85. See id. at 4–6.
86. Senator Levin seems to be concerned with the new rule not having an actual effect
due to the ability of bad actors to provide false information at will, a topic that the Associations 
also bring up but in a different context by questioning the true benefit of false information to 
law enforcement.  See Levin Letter, supra note 40, at 3–4. 
87. Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 79 Fed. Reg. at
45171. 
88. Id. at 45170.
89. Rowe & Burwell Letter, supra note 46, at 8–9.
90. Id. at 8–9, 12.
91. Id.
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of the proposed rule.92  Financial institutions do not have to verify that 
the people named as beneficial owners truly are the beneficial owners.93  
This designation would seem to allow bad actors to designate false 
beneficial owners, but FinCEN (in the NPRM) and the FTC (in its 
comment to the NPRM) noted “[e]ven false information provided to 
financial institutions can be useful to prove an individual’s knowledge of 
unlawful activity or intention to conceal assets.”94  In the FTC’s comment 
to the NPRM it discusses cases where the beneficial ownership 
information would have been helpful, even if the information were 
false.95  However, the Associations have questioned the extent to which 
false information will be beneficial to law enforcement.96 
The Associations argue financial institutions should not be 
responsible for verifying the designations by the legal entity customers.97  
They are concerned about the immense compliance burden that would be 
created if FinCEN were to require financial institutions to investigate 
complex businesses and their ownership structures.98  Implementing a 
verification requirement is also cautioned against by the Associations 
because of its potential to be so detrimental as to “drive businesses 
underground or off-shore.”99  Disagreeing with the Associations, FinCEN 
in its RIA, claims that the rule would be “unlikely to trigger legitimate 
account holder closings or to dissuade legitimate would-be new account 
holders from opening new accounts.”100  The American Bankers 
Association (“ABA”) cautions FinCEN’s optimism, claiming FinCEN’s 
opinion on account loss “is the triumph of hope over experience, a poor 
foundation for rulemaking.”101  The modern financial atmosphere, 
92. See Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 79 Fed. Reg.
at 45156. 
93. Id. at 45162; SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 49, at 18.
94. Rich & Vita Letter, supra note 32, at 4; Customer Due Diligence Requirements for
Financial Institutions, 79 Fed. Reg. at 45153. 
95. Rich & Vita Letter, supra note 32, at 4.
96. Rowe & Burwell Letter, supra note 46, at 26.
97. Id. at 10–11.
98. Id. at 10.
99. The Associations worry that the increased cost of doing business under the NPRM
will force businesses to use other sources of financing such as overseas financial institutions 
or P2P institutions not affected by the NPRM.  See id. at 10. 
100. REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, at 26.
101. Comment letter from Robert G. Rowe III, Vice President & Assoc. Chief Counsel,
Regulatory Compliance,  Am. Bankers Ass’n, to Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network 13 (Jan. 27 2016) 
[hereinafter Rowe, RIA Letter], 
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coupled with “the increased risk from incomplete or questionable 
information on beneficial ownership will cause lost accounts from 
legitimate customers.”102  Given the need for reasonable procedures, the 
NPRM’s current permission for financial institutions to rely upon self-
identification by legal entity customers should carry over into the final 
rule.103 
5. Monitoring
Except that the additional CDD applies to accounts opened one 
year after the final rule is enacted, there is little guidance in the NPRM 
for ongoing monitoring after the initial designations are made.104  The 
NPRM asserts, “periodic. . .monitoring” of CDD information must be 
performed by financial institutions, but how frequent and thorough the 
periodic monitoring must be is unclear.105  FinCEN, in its commentary to 
the NPRM, states that while additional monitoring is not required, “as a 
general matter, a financial institution should keep . . . beneficial 
ownership information, as current as possible and update as appropriate 
on a risk-basis.”106  An open question is whether financial institutions will 
be required to complete additional monitoring and file Suspicious 
Activity Reports (“SAR”) when a business mistakenly identifies the 
incorrect control person.107  Or, additionally, whether the filing of such a 
SAR will trigger an update of CDD information.108  Given the extensive 
number of accounts financial institutions will have to report on as well as 
the number of errors made by legal entity customers, especially smaller, 
http://www.aba.com/Advocacy/commentletters/Documents/cl-FinCEN-RIA-IRFA2016.pdf. 
102. Id.
103. Id. at 11.
104. See WEINSTOCK, ET AL., supra note 27, at 4.
105. Id. at 4.
106. Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 79 Fed. Reg.
45151, 45162 (Aug. 4, 2014) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. Pts. 1010, 1020, 1023, 1024, and 
1026). 
107. The NPRM leaves open the proposition that financial institutions “should update”
beneficial ownership information, which the Associations label as “the epitome of the type of 
vague expectation that leads to ‘understood best practices’ which in turn causes examiners 
and auditors to second guess what a financial institution is doing, eventually producing check-
the-box compliance.”  Rowe & Burwell Letter, supra note 46, at 18. 
108. Other than through normal business operations, financial institutions would be
unlikely to determine such information.  However, when such a mistake is brought to light, 
will a financial institution be required to file with FinCEN when the legal entity customer 
does not appear to be a risky entity?  Villa Letter, supra note 51, at 2. 
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less sophisticated entities, the additional monitoring will prove 
burdensome.109  By creating an overly burdensome system requiring 
extended monitoring and reporting with potential fines for financial 
institutions’ non-compliance, FinCEN risks making credit or bank 
services unavailable to uninformed legal entity customers.110 
6. Application to New Accounts Only
Industry associations are worried that FinCEN will reverse its 
decision as to the retroactive reach of the proposed rule in its final 
installment.111  Current CIP procedures do not require financial 
institutions to validate the identity of covered customers.112  To identify 
the beneficial owners of older accounts, financial institutions will have to 
go deeper in their CIP process and implement a much more complex 
system than that which is currently in place.113  CIP expansion is 
mitigated under the NPRM because, in its current state, financial 
institutions would not have to retroactively identify the beneficial owners 
of accounts opened before the rule takes effect.114  Since there are no 
systems in place and creating such systems would bear high costs without 
providing sufficient value,115 financial institutions “strongly believe that 
the requirement to obtain beneficial owner information should [continue 
to] be limited to new accounts only.”116 
FinCEN, however, in its RIA, has already brought the possibility 
of a retroactive final rule into play.117  The RIA does not address concerns 
over the costs of the final rule if it is not limited to new accounts, outside 
of the potential for an extended compliance date.118  On the one hand, 
109. Id. at 3–4.
110. Id. at 3.
111. Rowe & Burwell Letter, supra note 46, at 11–12; see also Villa Letter, supra note
51, at 3 (claiming that the retroactive approach to the beneficial ownership requirement would 
present an “insurmountable obstacle” to financial institutions). 
112. Villa Letter, supra note 51, at 3.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Rowe & Burwell Letter, supra note 46, at 11–12.
116. Comment letter from James R. Richards, EVP BSA Compliance Officer, Wells
Fargo & Company, to Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network. 3 (Oct. 2, 2014) [hereinafter Richards 
Letter], http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FINCEN-2014-0001-0077.  See 
Villa, supra note 51, at 3. 
117. See supra Part III.A.2; REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, at 9-10.
118. See REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, at 10.
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FinCEN’s desire to be thorough and implement as strong of a rule as 
possible by retroactively applying the 25% threshold makes sense.119  On 
the other hand, FinCEN does not consider that “existing customers 
already have an established history with the financial institution and an 
established track record of minimal or effectively managed risk.”120  
While the retroactive application of the rule may be beneficial to a certain 
extent, given the comments from the NPRM, it seems additional analysis 
should be undertaken before this particular alternative is incorporated.121 
7. Delayed Effective Date
Many commenters on the NPRM were dissatisfied with 
FinCEN’s proposal that full compliance with the CDD requirements take 
place one year after the final rule takes effect.122  The Associations 
estimate the task of updating the necessary technology systems will take 
financial institutions at least eighteen months, but caution that it may take 
longer.123  The majority of commenters asked for at least a twenty-four 
month period to transition to full compliance.124  The twenty-four month 
period may need to be extended based upon the changes made between 
the NPRM and the final rule.125  The reason for requesting the extension 
is clear—compliance with yet another BSA/AML requirement will take 
time, especially for financial institutions that already fail to meet current 
requirements.126  Another reason for needing additional time is the lack 
of personnel to implement the extensive technology systems overhaul 
that the proposed rule will require.127  In all, FinCEN’s one-year 
119. Id.
120. Rowe & Burwell Letter, supra note 46, at 11–12.
121. See id.
122. Id.; Richards Letter, supra note 116, at 2; Villa Letter, supra note 51, at 3–4.
123. Rowe & Burwell Letter, supra note 46, at 20–21.
124. Id.; Gimbert Letter, supra note 54, at 15; Richards Letter, supra note 116, at 2; Villa
Letter, supra note 51, at 3–4. 
125. Rowe & Burwell Letter, supra note 46, at 20–21; Gimbert Letter, supra note 54, at
15; Richards Letter, supra note 116, at 2; Villa Letter, supra note 51, at 3-4. 
126. The Bank of Mingo assessment is an example of a case in which a smaller financial
institution systemically failed in implementing even minimum current BSA/AML standards.  
In the Matter of Bank of Mingo, FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, (Jun 15, 2015) (Assessment of Civil Money Penalty) at 2–3. 
127. The Associations note that this regulation will be tough to implement due to the
limited availability of “qualified programmers.”  Rowe & Burwell Letter, supra note 46, at 
21.
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compliance period is beyond optimistic and unrealistic according to the 
majority of commenters.128 
B. Implications of the Additional CDD Requirements
The goal of the proposed CDD regulations is to “reduce illicit 
activity by providing easier access to beneficial ownership information to 
support law enforcement investigations.”129  The downside of the new 
regulations, however, is the vast costs associated with the proposed rule 
and the difficulty in calculating hard numbers to quantify the rule’s 
benefits.130  According to FinCEN, the quantitative costs of the CDD rule 
will be anywhere between $700 million and $1.5 billion over a period of 
ten years, with most of the costs being front-loaded.131  FinCEN does 
admit that their figure is lacking in one major unquantifiable cost—the 
cost of IT upgrades.132  Though unquantifiable, in their RIA FinCEN 
assigns necessary IT upgrades an “improbably large” upper boundary of 
$10 billion.133  Even if the IT costs come with a price tag that is one tenth 
of the “improbably large”134 upper boundary, the costs of implementing 
the final rule could easily double.135  Considering FinCEN’s research, in 
which one small financial institution estimated IT expenditures of fifty to 
seventy thousand dollars and one large institution estimated IT upgrades 
of $20 million, IT costs could easily rise above $2 billion.136 
FinCEN’s RIA has been challenged as failing to comply with the 
administrative process137 due to the RIA “significantly overstat[ing] the 
perceived benefits of the proposed CDD rule while underestimating, or 
128. Id.; Gimbert Letter, supra note 55, at 15; Richards Letter, supra note 116, at 2; Villa
Letter, supra note 51, at 3–4. 
129. REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, at 6.
130. Id. at 7–9.
131. Id. at 6.
132. Id. at 32.
133. FinCEN was unable to gain a large enough sample size to definitively assign a cost
to the IT upgrades.  With FinCEN approximating that 28,816 financial institutions will be 
required to make the necessary IT upgrades the ease with which cost can reach into the billions 
is put into context.  Id. at 32–33, 33 n.64. 
134. Id. at 33.
135. Id. at 32–33.
136. Id. at 33 n. 64.
137. Rowe, RIA Letter, supra note 101, at 6 (discussing how the RIA “[c]ontravene[s]
the Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 by failing to describe 
accurately the likely impact of the rule on private entities”). 
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ignoring entirely, significant costs, and therefore fail[ing] to satisfy the 
statutory mandates.”138  The lack of quantitative costs, which was pointed 
out by the ABA in their comment letter to the RIA,139 casts significant 
doubt upon the real cost of the regulation and its true benefit.140  
Considering that using FinCEN’s calculations IT costs alone could easily 
double the anticipated price of the bill, and the high likelihood of the 
FinCEN’s quantitative determinations being understated,141 the potential 
for a rule, that has been touted as having quantifiable costs of at most $1.5 
billion, ending with a multibillion dollar price tag is a sobering thought. 
In addition to the costs of the proposed rule, Senator Levin 
questions the NPRM on the basis of it not strengthening or meeting the 
goals of the BSA/AML regulations because it does not encompass a wide 
enough array of beneficial owners.”142  Senator Levin goes so far as to 
claim the proposed rule would actually weaken current AML practices 
and the NPRM’s focus on specific employee positions is a step away from 
international BSA/AML standards.143  The IMF and FATF measured 
FinCEN’s proposed rule and found it to be incongruent with FATF 
standards, which echoes the skepticism of Senator Levin.144  By setting a 
25% threshold under the ownership prong and an arbitrary designation 
for a control person, the proposed Beneficial Ownership Requirements 
fall short of protecting against fraud by leaving gaping loopholes for bad 
actors to avoid reporting.145  FinCEN does not foresee criminals reducing 
their beneficial ownership percentage given the difficulties associated 
with laundering money through a vehicle in which they hold only a 
138. Id.
139. Id. at 10.
140. See id.
141. Id.
142. Levin Letter, supra note 40, at 8.
143. Id.; THE FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, INT’L STANDARDS ON COMBATING MONEY
LAUNDERING AND THE FIN. OF TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION—THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS 
109 (2012), http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf. 
144. In its assessment of the United States and its Anti-Money Laundering efforts the
International Monetary Fund notes the reliance on customer certification as a factor for why 
the NPRM is not fully in compliance with FATF standards and why the proposed rule does 
not completely address the control aspect of beneficial ownership.  IMF, Anti-Money 
Laundering and Combating the Fin. of Terrorism (AML/CFT), Technical Note 11 (Jul. 2015), 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2015/cr15174.pdf. 
145. Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 79 Fed. Reg.
45151 (Aug. 4, 2014) (to be codified at 31 CFR Parts 1010, 1020, 1023, 1024, and 1026). 
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minority stake.146  FinCEN’s projection, however, does not seem to take 
into consideration sophisticated criminal organizations who would have 
an organization sizeable enough that minority stake would not be an 
issue.147 
C. Recommendations
Notwithstanding FinCEN’s intentions to provide clarity to CDD 
requirements, the manner in which it has formulated the new beneficial 
ownership requirement has created a regulation that is ineffective and 
poses unjustifiable expenses upon financial institutions.  In an attempt to 
set forth a feasible rule, the NPRM has been deemed to “weaken current 
AML practices”148 by some commentators and to be “burdensome”149 by 
others.  While the additional CDD requirements might be a slight boon 
to enforcement agencies by giving them a starting point for their search, 
that boon is counteracted by the increased costs to law-abiding legal 
entity customers150 and the potential for financial institutions to lose 
customers.151  To reiterate Senator Levin and the vast majority of 
commenters on the NPRM, the proposed rule should not be adopted in its 
current form152 because its potential benefits are outweighed by the 
unjustified burden it will have on legal entity customers and financial 
institutions.153  FinCEN counters the unjustified-costs assertion with a 
break-even analysis in their impact assessment, determining the final rule 
will only need to reduce the volume of illicit activity by 0.57% in each of 
the next ten years.154  Such a small increase may seem easy to achieve, 
146. See REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, at 16.
147. See id.
148. Levin Letter, supra note 40, at 8.
149. Rowe & Burwell Letter, supra note 46, at 21–22.
150. In its impact assessment FinCEN states that competition amongst financial
institutions will limit the amount of the costs that can be passed on to the customers but given 
that the billions that financial institutions will be forced to expend it would only follow that 
at least a portion of that will be passed on to customers.  REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, 
supra note 13, at 8 n.9. 
151. Rowe & Burwell Letter, supra note 46, at 25–26 (noting the CDD requirements may
lead some customers to take their business overseas or underground). 
152. FinCEN’s impact assessment suggests three possible alternatives to the current rule,
two of which they themselves expose the inefficiencies of and the third would only increase 
the costs associated with the current rule.  REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, 
at 9–10. 
153. Id. at 25–26.
154. Id. at 11.
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but the extent to which the Beneficial Ownership Requirement will affect 
the $300 billion in yearly illicit proceeds from money laundering is 
difficult to determine when there are “unquantifiable benefits and 
costs.”155 
Instead of requiring financial institutions to perform CDD and 
beneficial ownership analysis for the vast number of accounts that will be 
opened by currently covered legal entities, a risk-based approach156 
should instead be applied.157  Additionally, the types of legal entities 
exempted from the rule should be expanded.158  If a risk-based approach 
is adopted, the 25% threshold could be lowered, as Senator Levin 
suggests, without the overly burdensome outcome feared by the 
Associations.159  FinCEN’s alternative160 of retroactively applying the 
Beneficial Ownership Requirements to previously opened accounts 
should not be implemented.161  FinCEN, however could provide the 
largest benefit to law enforcement while minimizing the extensive costs 
to financial institutions and their customers by applying the rule 
retroactively only when a legal entity customer has engaged in suspicious 
activity and does not have a history of “minimal or effectively managed 
risk”162 with the financial institution. 
Finally, the question remains as to whether financial institutions 
are the best gatekeepers and collectors of such information.163  Not only 
do financial institutions not create the legal entities for which they are 
being asked to provide information, but also they have no mandate to 
verify the legal entity’s CDD information.164  Financial institutions also 
do not have regulatory power over the legal entity customers FinCEN is 
requiring them to report on.165  Senator Levin is concerned that the NPRM 
155. Id. at 30.
156. See supra Part III.1.
157. Gimbert Letter, supra note 53, at 12–13.
158. Rowe & Burwell Letter, supra note 46, at 6–8.
159. See Levin Letter, supra note 40, at 3–4 (stating that the threshold is to high); Rowe
& Burwell Letter, supra note 46, at 9 (stating that by lowering the threshold the costs will 
rise). 
160. REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, at 9–10.
161. See Rowe & Burwell Letter, supra note 46, at 11–12 (discussing the unjustified costs
of retroactive implementation). 
162. Id.
163. Id. at 25.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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is not up to par with international standards by not encompassing 
“ultimate effective control” in its definition of a control person.166  
Incorporating ultimate effective control however, would require financial 
institutions to verify legal entity customer information, which they are 
not in a position to do.167  Alternatively, rather than requiring financial 
institutions to report on beneficial ownership, federal and state registries 
for such information could be maintained by the Internal Revenue Service 
because that agency is more likely to have access to the requisite 
information.168 
IV. CONCLUSION
The Beneficial Ownership Requirement has many uncertainties 
surrounding it, the most prominent being its effectiveness, or rather lack 
of it.  One certainty regarding the proposed rule, which is not a boon to 
FinCEN as they look to push the final rule into existence, is the exorbitant 
cost that will be withstood to comply with the rule.  As the final rule is 
drafted and comes into effect, FinCEN would be well-served by taking 
into consideration the issues that have been raised in order to avoid an 
ineffective rule that will cost financial institutions and their customers 
billions of dollars. 
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166. Levin Letter, supra note 40, at 5
167. Rowe & Burwell Letter, supra note 46, at 26.
168. Id.
